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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide 
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the district court err in granting judgment against Pettit and 
Glezos personally where the court found it an undisputed fact that these individuals were 
acting on behalf of their respective of limited liability companies? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. 
The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according 
deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994). A trial 
court's decision not to pierce the corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial 
evidence in favor of the judgment." D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, f 21. 
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Preserved: Defendants filed a timely 
motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new trial. R. 584-
586. 
2. Issue: Considering that it was an undisputed fact that Pettit and Glezos were 
acting on behalf of their respective limited liability companies, did the trial court abused 
its discretion by not requiring those entities to be joined as indispensable parties? 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of whether a party should be 
joined to an action will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder, 
2001 UT62,^[40. 
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Preserved: Defendants filed a timely 
motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new trial. R. 584-
586. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c). 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the 
moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set 
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment 
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's 
facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that 
is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of 
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to 
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a 
2 
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in his absence may (I) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of 
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall 
order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but 
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his 
joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a 
person as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made 
a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
3 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-601: General Rule. 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a 
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a 
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or 
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff-appellee filed suit in connection with a Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
(the "Agreement") between plaintiff-appellee and Defendant STC Holdings ("STC"). 
Plaintiff-appellee sought declaratory relief with respect to the meaning of certain 
provisions of the Agreement. Plaintiff-appellee also asserted claims for breach of 
contract, wrongful lien, quiet title, slander of title and interference with economic 
relations. Plaintiff-appellee alleged that STC was a general partnership consisting of 
Glezos and Pettit and therefore these individuals were personally liable. 
Eventually, plaintiff-appellee and the district court determined that it was an 
undisputed fact that Pettit and Glezos were not partners in STC but rather STC was a dba 
of Land Solutions, LC and Glezos was its only member. It was also an undisputed fact 
that Pettit was acting on behalf of 90th South Joint Venture, LLC. Nonetheless the district 
court imposed personal liability on Pettit and Glezos. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendants answered the complaint, alleging as affirmative defenses, inter alia, 
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that Plaintiff had failed to join indispensable parties, namely Land Solutions, LC. Land 
Solutions, LC, sought to intervene in the case. Defendants brought a motion asserting 
that Defendant Pettit was not personally involved in the transaction and should be 
dismissed. Discovery was conducted and, thereafter, plaintiff-appellee moved for 
summary judgment against all Defendants which was granted. The order granting 
summary judgment made a factual determination that Pettit and Glezos were acting on 
behalf of their respective limited liability companies; however, the order imposed 
personal liability on both Glezos and Pettit. 
Thereafter, Defendants objected to the entry of judgment against Glezos and Pettit 
personally and filed a motion styled "Motion to Set Aside Judgment, for Relief from 
Judgment and for New Trial." Plaintiff filed its Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit in 
Support of Award of Attorneys' Fees. Defendants' objected to the reasonableness of the 
fees and filed a second post-judgment motion styled "Defendants' Supplemental Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment - Dismissal of Glen Pettit." 
These post-judgment motions were pending when Defendants terminated their 
legal counsel. New counsel was retained and Defendants' Rule 60(b) motion was filed. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
Having granted summary judgment and entered a judgment against defendants, a 
hearing was held on (1) defendants' motion to set aside judgment, motion for relief from 
judgment, motion for new trial and other relief; (2) defendants' objections to the award of 
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attorneys' fees; (3) the pending supplemental motion for partial summary judgment, 
seeking dismissal of Pettit; and (4) the Rule 60(b) motion filed by Defendants newly 
retained counsel. 
At the hearing, Defendants withdrew their objection to the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees requested by Plaintiff-appellee's counsel and fees were awarded, as 
requested. The trial court denied the Defendants' three pending motions and this appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action arises out of the Agreement for the purchase of certain real 
property located in Davis County, Utah. The parties to the Agreement were the plaintiff-
appellee as seller and "STC Holdings or assigns" ("STC") as purchaser. R. 366-375. 
2. The Agreement provided for a specific purchase price for the real property, 
which was to be adjusted for unuseable acreage. The dispute which lead to litigation 
arose from the parties' different interpretations of the Agreement's provisions and 
requirements concerning what constitutes "unuseable" acreage and the process by which 
that acreage is to be determined. Passim. 
3. Purchaser, STC Holdings is a dba of Land Solutions, LC, which assigned 
its interest the Agreement to 90th South Joint Venture, L.C. R. 575, 578. 
4. 90th South Joint Venture, LLC, executed a settlement statement in an effort 
to close on the property. R. 578. 
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5. Hence, Land Solutions, LC and 90 South Joint Venture, LLC together with 
plaintiff-appellee were the only parties involved in the Agreement. R. 575, 578. 
The Complaint 
6. In late 2005, a complaint was filed in which the Plaintiff-appellee named 
STC, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit as defendants. Glezos and Pettit were named in their 
personal capacities as plaintiff-appellee incorrectly assumed STC was a general 
partnership made up of these two individuals. R. 1-17. 
7. Obviously, plaintiff-appellee's complaint never alleged any that Glezos 
and/or Pettit were alter egos of any corporate entity as the complaint never contemplated 
the participation of limited liability companies. Id. Later the plaintiff-appellee would 
eventually acknowledge that Glezos and Pettit acted on behalf of their respective limited 
liability companies. R. 179-180. 
The Answers and Affirmative Defense of Defendants 
8. STC and Glezos filed an Answer in which they raised the affirmative 
defense of failure to join Land Solutions, LC, as an indispensable party. R. 25. 
9. Pettit filed an Answer and also raised the affirmative defense of failure to 
join Land Solutions, LC, as an indispensable party. R. 101. 
Land Solutions, LC's Motion to Intervene 
10. Shortly after STC and Glezos answered the complaint, Land Solutions, LC 
filed a motion to intervene. R. 35-37. Plaintiff-appellee never filed a response to the 
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motion to intervene. R. 39-40. 
11. About a month after the motion to intervene was filed a notice to submit the 
motion for a decision was with the district court. Id. 
12. Shortly after the notice was filed, former counsel for defendants filed a 
letter addressed to plaintiff-appellee's counsel. R. 41. This letter memorializes a 
conversation defendants' counsel had with the district court clerk whereby the court via 
the clerk granted Land Solutions' motion to intervene. Id. 
13. Plaintiff-appellee's counsel received the letter and proposed order. R. 685. 
However, plaintiff-appellee did not agree that STC should be dismissed from the 
litigation. Id. 
14. No order granting Land Solution, LC's motion to intervene was ever 
entered. 
Motion to Dismiss Pettit 
15. In early 2006, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Pettit from the 
litigation, supported by the affidavit of Glezos. R. 105-109, 97-99, respectively. 
16. In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asserted that STC was a 
partnership made up of Pettit and Glezos. R. 165-166. 
17. Plaintiff-appellee also noted in its memorandum in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss Pettit that: 
a. Pettit signed the settlement statement which accompanied the tender 
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of the reduced purchase price on behalf of 90th South Joint Venture, the assignee of 
STC Holdings (R. 166); 
b. Pettit signed a check for $10,000.00 which was submitted with the 
settlement statement (Id.); 
c. Pettit, along with Glezos, ordered the survey commissioned in 
connection with the purchase of the subject property (R. 167); and, 
d. that Pettit, along with Glezos, had conversations with an appraiser 
and a surveyor about the property. Id.. 
18. Defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on their Motion to 
Dismiss Pettit (R. 470-471) prior to the entry of judgment but the motion was heard as a 
post-judgment motion. R. 728-730. 
Plaintiff-appellee's Successful Motion for Summary Judgment 
19. In its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff-appellee acknowledged that 
STC was not a general partnership, but a dba for Land Solutions, LC, that Glezos was the 
manager for STC and that Pettit was the manager of 90th South Joint Venture, LLC. R. 
179-80. However, neither the plaintiff-appellee or the court sought to join these entities. 
20. Defendants responded to the motion for summary judgment, but did not 
comply with the strict requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 7; specifically, defendants did not 
repeat, verbatim, the statement of undisputed facts as alleged by the plaintiff-appellee and 
specifically designate which facts were and were not admitted. R. 345-377. 
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21. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
against all Defendants on September 25, 2007. The order makes no distinction between 
the liability of the party to the contract, STC, and the individual members of the limited 
liability companies involved in the transactions. R. 573-583. 
22. The order granting summary judgment states in pertinent part: 
Defendant STC Holdings is a dba or trade name for Land 
Solutions, L.C., a Utah limited liability company. Steve 
Glezos is the registered agent and sole member of Land 
Solutions, L.C. .. .Steve Glezos, acting as STC Holdings, 
entered a contract [the breach of which is the basis for the 
litigation] . . . . 
Glen R. Pettit executed the Assignment of [the contract which 
is the subject of the litigation] as the authorized agent and sole 
member of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C, a Utah limited 
liability company. 
R. 575, 578. 
23. Although the order granting summary judgment contemplated allowing 
defendants 15 days to object to plaintiff-appellee's attorneys' fees, (R. 581) the judgment 
was entered immediately after the order granting summary judgment. R. 568-572. 
24. The judgment imposed a monetary award against Glezos and Pettit 
personally in the amount of $115,736.26 which represented plaintiff-appellee's attorneys' 
fees and costs. R. 569. 
Post-Judgment Motions 
25. Defendants filed a timely motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from 
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the judgment and for a new trial on October 10, 2006 (R. 584-586), objections to 
proposed award of Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs (R. 587-596), supported by the 
affidavit of former counsel for Defendants (R. 597-599), and a "supplemental motion for 
partial summary judgment" regarding the dismissal of Pettit. (R. 600-604). 
26. Thereafter, a notice of substitution of defendants' counsel was filed, 
together with a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b). R. 
661-666. 
27. Thereafter, a hearing was held on the pending motion to dismiss Pettit, the 
Defendants' objections to Plaintiffs affidavit of attorneys' fees and costs, Defendants' 
motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new trial, and the 
Rule 60(b) motion.1 /?. 770. 
28. At the hearing, the trial court denied all post-judgment motions of the 
Defendants. After an effort by the parties to settle the matter, an order denying the 
motions was entered on April 3, 2007. R. 728-730. 
29. Notice of Appeal was timely filed by Defendants. R. 732-733. 
1
 Defendants' counsel mistakenly hired a court reporter to attend the January 25, 
2007 hearing and draft a transcript which was then filed with the court. Once counsel 
learned this was an error he had an Official Court Reporter prepare and file a transcript. 
Hence, the record on appeal contains two transcripts for the same hearing. Counsel 
apologizes for his blunder. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
An internally inconsistent order granting summary judgment was entered in this 
case. On the one hand, it acknowledges that Pettit and Glezos were acting as agents of 
limited liability companies. On the other hand, it imposes personal liability on Pettit and 
Glezos in contravention of the general rule that agents are not personally liable for 
judgments entered against the limited liability companies on whose behalf they serve. 
The district court did this even though no facts were ever alleged which would provide a 
basis to ''pierce the corporate veil" or otherwise support a judgment against Pettit and 
Glezos personally. The entry of the summary judgment order was error. 
Defendants submitted pleadings and made objections which at the very least put 
plaintiff-appellee, as well as, the district court on notice that the real parties in interest 
should be joined, Le., the limited liability companies on whose behalf Pettit and Glezos 
were acting. Despite the submission of these pleading and the eventual determination by 
the court that Pettit and Glezos were in fact acting as agents of limited liability 
companies, the district court never cause those entities to be joined and refused to absolve 
Pettit and Glezos of personal liability. This was an error. 
Defendants seek to have the summary judgment order and judgment vacated. It 
further seeks to have this case remanded with instructions to allow Land Solutions, LC 
and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC to intervene, assert counterclaims, conduct discovery, 
and join third-parties. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PETTIT AND GLEZOS PERSONALLY WHERE IT FOUND 
THEY WERE ACTING ON BEHALF OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES. 
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 56. On review from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court 
accords no deference to the trial court because entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law. Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 2001 UT 16 at $12. It is the function of the 
appellate court to determine whether the trial court erred in applying the law and whether 
the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Kouris v. 
Utah Highway Patrol 70 P.3d 32, 2003 UT 19 at f 2. 
In its order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff-appellee the district court 
found that there was no dispute regarding the following two facts: 
[First,] Defendant STC Holdings is a dba or trade name for 
Land Solutions, L.C., a Utah limited liability company. Steve 
Glezos is the registered agent and sole member of Land 
Solutions, L.C. . . .Steve Glezos, acting as STC Holdings, 
entered a contract [the breach of which is the basis for the 
litigation] . . . . 
* * * 
[Second,] Glen R. Pettit executed the Assignment of [the 
contract which is the subject of the litigation] as the 
authorized agent and sole member of 90th South Joint 
Venture, L.C, a Utah limited liability company. 
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R. 575, 578. 
Clearly, the district court found that Glezos and Pettit were acting on behalf of 
their respective limited liability companies. However, it imposed judgment against them 
personally rather than against their limited liability companies; this was an error. 
Utah law protects organizers, members, managers and employees from personal 
liability for actions taken while acting for the limited liability company. 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a 
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a 
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or 
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2C-601 . 
In order for the district court to have imposed person liability against Pettit and 
Glezos the "complaint must plead [and the district court must find] a concurrence of two 
circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, 
in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate 
form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow." 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan, 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). 
In the present case the complaint is devoid of any such allegations. As the 
complaint makes clear, plaintiff-appellee was originally under the impression that STC 
was a general partnership between Pettit and Glezos. R. 2. It logically follows that 
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plaintiff-appellees could never have sought to "pierce the corporate veil" because they 
never realized that limited liability companies were involved. 
Defendants plead the affirmative defense of failure to join and indispensable party. 
R. 25, 101. Land Solutions, L.C., filed a motion to intervene. R. 35-37. Defendant Pettit 
filed a motion seeking his dismissal from the litigation. R. 105-109. Eventually, 
plaintiff-appellee acknowledged that both Pettit and Glezos were acting on behalf of their 
respective limited liability companies (See plaintiff-appellee's motion for summary 
judgement, R. 179, f l 3-4) and the district court found this to be an undisputed fact. R. 
575, 578. However, plaintiff-appellee took no action whatsoever to join the limited 
liability companies. 
After entry of the $115,736.26 judgment, defendants timely filed a "Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion for a New Trial and for Other 
Relief." R. 584-586. In that motion defendants clearly objected to Pettit's and Glezos' 
personal liability. Id. Defendant Pettit further objected to his personal liability in his 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R. 600-604. Finally, new counsel for defendants 
timely filed a motion under UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion. All of these motions were 
denied. R. 728-730. 
Because the summary judgment order is internally inconsistent - it both 
acknowledges that Pettit and Glezos were acting on behalf of their respective limited 
liability companies yet imposes personal liability on them - this Court should vacated the 
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order. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT REQUIRING 
JOINDER OF ENTITIES IT FOUND TO BE THE REAL PARTIES IN 
INTEREST BUT RATHER IMPOSED PERSONAL LIABILITY ON THEIR 
AGENTS IN CONTRAVENTION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2C-601. 
A party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable party for the first 
time on appeal. Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Fire Civ. Serv. Council, 1999 UT App 65, f 
9 (citations omitted). Joiner of parties is governed by UTAH R. CIV. P. 19, which states in 
pertinent part: 
A [limited liability company which] is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as 
a party in the action if... (2) [it] claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in [its] absence may . . . leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by 
reason of his claimed interest. If [it] has not been so joined, 
the court shall order that [it] be made a party. [(Emphasis 
added.)] 
A trial court's determination of whether a party should be joined to an action will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62 , f 40. 
Originally, plaintiff-appellee alleged that Pettit and Glezos were general partners 
of STC Holdings. R. 2. Defendants took the following steps to address the issue of 
defendants failure to join Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC: 
1. STC and Glezos filed an answer in which they raised 
the affirmative defense of failure to join Land 
Solutions, LC as an indispensable party. R. 25. 
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2. Pettit filed an answer and also raised the affirmative 
defense of failure to join Land Solutions, L.C. as an 
indispensable party. R. 101. 
3. In their initial disclosures, defendants tendered a 
settlement statement which clearly indicated that 90th 
South Joint Venture was a relevant party. R. 94-96. 
4. Land Solutions, L.C. filed a motion to intervene. R. 
35-37. 
5. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Pettit from the 
litigation. R. 105-109. 
6. Defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
their Motion to Dismiss Pettit prior to the hearing on 
plaintiff-appellee's motion for summary judgment. R. 
470-471. 
7. After the judgment was entered against defendants 
they filed a timely motion to set aside the summary 
judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new 
trial and in that motion reiterated that Land Solutions, 
LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC were the real 
parties in interest. R. 584-586. 
8. Again, defendants sought the dismissal of Pettit from 
the litigation after entry of judgment. R. 600-604. 
9. Defendants timely filed a motion under UTAH R. CIV. P 
60(b) seeking the nullification of the judgment on the 
grounds that the real party in interest, Land Solutions, 
LC was not joined. R. 661-666. 
10. At the hearing of post-judgment motions, defendants 
offered to "roll over" the judgment against them should 
Land Solutions, L.C. and 90th South Joint Venture, 
L.L.C. be allowed to intervene in the case. In other 
words, should it be determine that Land Solutions and 
90th South Joint Venture were labile for the breach of 
17 
the Agreement the currently existing judgment against 
them would be "rolled over" and added to the 
subsequent judgment. R. 770, p.27-28. 
Plaintiff-appellee acknowledged in its motion for summary judgment that indeed 
Glezos and Pettit were acting on behalf of Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint 
Venture. R. 179-180. It necessarily follows that these entities should have been joined as 
parties yet, plaintiff-appellee never sought their joinder. 
Based on plaintiff-appellee's summary judgment motion, the district court 
ultimately found that Pettit and Glezos were acting on behalf of limited liability 
companies, however, it imposed personal liability upon them nonetheless. At the post-
judgment hearing the district court made much of the fact that defendants former counsel 
did not comply with UTAH R. CIV. P. 7 and dispute the factual assertions of the plaintiff-
appellee. R. 770, p.3. However, defendants agreed the fact that both Pettit and Glezos 
were acting in their corporate capacity and therefore immune from judgment by operation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2c-601. 
Upon recognizing the capacity in which Glezos and Pettit were involved in this 
transaction the district court should have ordered the joinder of Land Solutions, LC and 
90th South Joint Venture, LLC. Instead, the court imposed personal liability on Pettit and 
Glezos; this was error. 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court remand this case with instructions 
to the district court that Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC be joined 
18 
and given an opportunity to conduct discovery, assert counterclaims and join third-parties. 
CONCLUSION 
It was error for the district court to enter an internally inconsistent order which, 
one the one hand, acknowledged that Pettit and Glezos were at all relevant times acting in 
their capacity as agents of limited liability companies, yet on the other hand, imposed 
personal liability on them. Further, Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, 
LLC should have been joined as parties because the undisputed facts in the order granting 
summary judgment clearly detail their involvement. 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court vacated the judgment and summary 
judgment order and remand this case with instructions to the district court that Land 
Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC be joined and given an opportunity to 
conduct discovery, assert counterclaims and join third-parties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of November, 2007. 
WALTER T. KEANE 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HORTON V. BOURNE PARTNERSHIP, 
LTD., a Utah limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STC HOLDINGS, a Utah general 
partnership; STEVE GLEZOS, an 
individual; and GLEN PETTIT, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050603171 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
On August 14, 2006 this matter came before the Court for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Horton V. Bourne Partnership, Ltd., ("the Bourne Partnership") was 
represented by Milo Steven Marsden. STC Holdings, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit (together 
"Defendants") were represented by Stephen G. Homer. Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted 
memorandums of law and presented oral argument, after which the matter was submitted for decision. 
After fully reviewing the parties' memorandums of law, the pleadings, and depositions, answers to 
o S12> 
interrogatories, admissions and other factual material from the record, and having heard the parties' oral 
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that it is in a position to rule on the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and hereby rules as follows: 
1. The Court finds that, based on the materials the parties have submitted to the Court, 
summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact. Accordingly, there is no issue left to try. Based on the 
undisputed material facts, the Court finds that the Bourne Partnership is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
2. The Court finds that in responding to the Bourne Partnership's motion for summary 
judgment, Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants did not identify particular paragraphs of the Bourne Partnership's statement of 
facts that were controverted; nor did they provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute 
supported by citation to relevant materials in the record. Pursuant to Rule 7, the Bourne Partnership's 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts are deemed admitted for purposes of this summary judgment 
motion. 
3. The Court further finds that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Defendants, there is no genuine issue as to at least the following facts: 
a. The Bourne Partnership is in possession of and holds title to certain real property 
located in Davis County, Utah, along Burke Lane west of Interstate 15 (hereinafter the "Burke Lane 
Property"). The Burke Lane Property is more specifically identified by Tax I.D. # 080600004. Its legal 
description is as follows: 
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BEGINNING ON THE NORTH LINE OF BURKE LANE AT THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF LOT 1, BLOCK 34, BIG CREEK PLAT, 
DAVIS COUNTY SURVEY, AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 40.0 
RODS; THENCE EAST 35.50 RODS, MORE OR LESS TO THE 
WESTERLY LINE OF A RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY; THENCE 
SOUTHEASTERLY 834.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS ALONG SAID 
RAILROAD; THENCE SOUTH 9.0 RODS TO THE NORTH LINE OF 
BURKE LANE; THENCE WEST 82.0 RODS, MORE OR LESS TO 
THE POINT OF BEGINNING. CONT. 16.19 ACRES. 
b. Defendant STC Holdings is a dba or trade name for Land Solutions, L.C, a Utah 
limited liability company. Steve Glezos is the registered agent and sole member of Land Solutions, L.C. 
c. On or about June 15, 2004, the Bourne Partnership and Steve Glezos, acting as 
STC Holdings, entered a contract for the purchase and sale of the Burke Lane Property. The contract 
was made up of a written ''Purchase Agreement," that Defendants drafted, and two pre-printed 
"Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract" forms, on which the parties had exchanged counteroffers 
regarding price and a few other terms. 
d. The "Effective Date" of the Purchase Agreement was June 15, 2004. 
e. The Purchase Agreement provides that the price for the Burke Lane Property is to 
be "$600,000, or $37,060 per net usable acre." The term "net usable acres" is defined in Section 2(a) of 
the Purchase Agreement as follows: 
The term "net usable acres" as used herein shall mean the gross number of 
acres within the Property reduced by that portion of the Property which is 
unusable because of easements, dedications of right-of-way for roadway 
purposes of [sic] other purposes which would prevent the erection of any 
improvements on that portion of the Property affected and which are 
existing as of the date of the final Survey. 
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f. The Purchase Agreement further specifies deadlines for the parties to perform 
their obligations under the contract related to determining whether any property is to be excluded under 
the definition of "net usable acres." 
g. Paragraph 6 of the Purchase Agreement states that "within thirty (30) days of the 
Effective Date of the Agreement," the Seller is to provide the Buyer with "a copy of any survey(s) of the 
Property in the Seller's possession." The Buyer "may, at its sole cost, within ten (10) days of receiving 
any such Survey(s), order an update of [sic] new Survey as Buyer may desire." Paragraph 6 further 
provides that "[i]f buyer elects to update or enhance the Survey, it shall pursue completion of the same 
with diligence." 
h. The Court finds that Defendants had only until July 25, 2004 (i.e., 40 days after 
the Effective Date) by which to order an update of any existing survey or to order a new survey of the 
Burke Lane Property. 
i. Paragraph 7 of the Purchase Agreement states that "Buyer shall give notice to 
Seller of any matters contained in the Title Commitment of [sic] Survey to which Buyer objects." 
Paragraph 8 of the Purchase Agreement states that "Seller shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of the 
notice contemplated by paragraph 7 . . . to cure the Objections to the satisfaction of Buyer or elect no[t] 
to cure the same." 
j . Paragraph 12 of the Purchase Agreement states that the transaction "shall be 
closed on the Closing date at the office of the Title Company." Paragraph 12 defines "Closing date" as a 
date within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the Feasibility Period, or satisfaction or waiver of the 
feasibility conditions. Here, the Court finds that the last day for Closing was no later than July 13, 2005. 
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k. Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement states that "[i]f closing does not occur 
due solely to a default by Buyer, Seller shall retain the Earnest Money and all other deposits as 
liquidated damages." And, paragraph 25 of the Purchase Agreement states that "[i]n any action arising 
out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." 
1. There is conflicting evidence regarding the date when Mr. Glezos first engaged 
Ralph Goff & Associates ("Goff) to survey the Burke Lane Property. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Defendants for purposes of this motion for summary judgment, it appears that Mr. 
Glezos engaged Goff "somewhere the week of June 20th of 2004," and asked them to survey the Burke 
Lane Property. 
m. It was not until nearly one year later, June 6, 2005, that Goff representatives went 
to the Burke Lane Property and performed fieldwork, and it was not until June 24, 2005 that the survey 
was completed (the "Goff survey"). 
n. The Goff survey plotted three areas it called "wetland areas": wetlands area 1, 
consisting of 1.3139 acres; wetlands area 2, consisting of .0645 acres; and wetlands area 3 consisting of 
.1385 acres. 
o. In plotting these "wetland areas," Goff did not do a wetlands delineation in 
compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, The Rivers and Harbor Act, or regulations 
promulgated by the Army Corp of Engineers under these statutes. 
p. Goff is not qualified by schooling, experience, or otherwise, to perform a 
wetlands delineation in compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, The Rivers and 
Harbor Act, or regulations promulgated by the Army Corp of Engineers under these statutes. 
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q. The Goff survey also plotted an area it designated as "Surveyed Easement for 
Utah Power and Light." This area contained approximately Vi of an acre of ground that was not within 
the legal description of any easement that appears in the state or county records. 
r. On July 7, 2005, Defendant "Land Solutions, L.C., or STC Holdings, or Steve 
Glezos," executed an "Assignment of Purchase Agreement," pursuant to which Land Solutions, L.C., 
STC Holdings and Steve Glezos "assign[ed], transfer [red], and set over to 90th South Joint Venture, 
L.C., or Assigns, all right, title, and interest in and to the Purchase Agreement dated June 15, 2004. . . ." 
Glen R. Pettit executed the Assignment of Purchase Agreement as the authorized agent and sole member 
of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C., a Utah limited liability company. 
s. On July 8, 2005, the Defendants sent the Bourne Partnership a letter telling the 
Bourne Partnership that the closing documents had been executed and funds had been delivered to the 
escrow agent. The letter stated that wC[t]he purchase price has been adjusted as defined in paragraph 6d 
of the Real Estate Purchase Contract." Attached to the letter was a "Settlement Statement" showing 
$449,888.58 as the "Contract Sales Price." All of the closing documents, including the Settlement 
Statement, were executed by Glen Pettit, on behalf of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C. 
t. On July 8, 2005, the Bourne Partnership notified the Defendants that their 
adjustment to the price was incorrect, and that their tender was insufficient. 
u. On July 15, 2005, Defendant STC Holdings filed a "Notice of Interest" on the 
Burke Lane Property with the Davis County Recorder. 
4. Based upon these undisputed facts, the Court concludes and determines that Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment is well-taken and should be granted. 
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a. The Court concludes that under the Purchase Agreement the burden was on the 
Defendants, as Buyers, to establish that property was "unusable" and that an adjustment to the $600,000 
purchase price was appropriate. 
b. In order to deduct property, the Defendants needed to show that the property was 
"unusable because of easements, dedications of nght-of-way for roadway purposes of [sic] other 
purposes which would prevent the erection of any improvements on that portion of the Property affected 
and which are existing as of the date of the final Survey." 
c. Defendants made at least two property deductions that were not justified under the 
language of the Purchase Agreement. 
i. First, Defendants deducted approximately 1.5169 acres as "wetlands." 
However, there is no admissible evidence to support the determination that 1.5169 acres 
of the Burke Lane Property is unusable because it is "wetlands." The only evidence 
offered on this point is the Goff survey. However, to provide admissible evidence that 
portions of the Burke Lane Property are wetlands, Goff would have to be qualified under 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to provide expert testimony on this topic. The 
Court knows from its experience in cases involving the Legacy Highway that wetlands 
delineations require highly specialized knowledge. There is nothing before the Court to 
show that Goff is qualified to offer opinions on this topic. Indeed, it is undisputed that 
Goff is not qualified to make a wetlands determination, and is not qualified to offer 
expert testimony on this topic. In light of this, the Court concludes that there is no 
evidence to support Defendants' deduction of approximately 1.5169 acres as "wetlands" 
under the Purchase Agreement. 
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ii. Second, Defendants deducted approximately Vi an acre of property as a 
"Surveyed Easement for Utah Power and Light." However, the undisputed facts are that 
this Vi acre of ground is not within the legal description of any easement that appears in 
the state or county records. There is no evidence in the record to support its exclusion. 
The Court concludes that it should not have been deducted because there was no basis to 
do so. 
d. The Court concludes that the Defendants also breached their obligations under the 
Purchase Agreement with regard to when they were to obtain a survey and to provide it to the Bourne 
Partnership. The Purchase Agreement required the Defendants to order a survey or an update of a 
survey within 40 days after the Effective Date, and it required the Defendants to pursue completion of 
the survey with diligence. Here, the Defendants essentially sat on their hands for a year, and then 
provided the Bourne Partnership their survey just a few days before the last day for closing the 
transaction. The Court concludes that the Defendants did not pursue completion of their survey with 
diligence. 
Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY DECLARED AND ORDERED, 
1. That the Bourne Partnership's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. That because of Defendants' failure to tender the purchase price for the Burke Lane 
Property required under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Purchase Agreement expired by its 
terms on July 13, 2005; 
3. That the Bourne Partnership is the owner of fee title to the Burke Lane Property, and that 
the Defendants and each of them has no right, title, estate or interest therein; 
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4. That the "Notice of Interest" in the Burke Lane Property filed by Defendant STC 
Holdings on July 15, 2005 is declared null and void; and 
5. That pursuant to paragraph 25 of the Purchase Agreement, the Bourne Partnership is the 
prevailing party and is entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The Bourne 
Partnership shall serve an affidavit of its fees and costs by September 13, 2006. Defendants' objections, 
if any, to the Bourne Partnership's affidavit shall be served and filed by October 13, 2006. 
DATED this M * vday of RKd v  %k* 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered on the 8lh day of September, 2006, to 
the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
4844-5863-5521\2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered via U.S. Mail, on the 19th day of September, 
2006, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
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Milo Steven Marsden (4879) 
Patricia C.Staible (10849) 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801)933-7360 
Facsimile: (801)933-7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HORTON V. BOURNE PARTNERSHIP, 
LTD., a Utah limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STC HOLDINGS, a Utah general 
partnership; STEVE GLEZOS, an 
individual; and GLEN PETTIT, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Civil No. 050603171 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
VD19548327 
050603171 STC HOLDINGS 
On January 25,2007 this matter came before the Court for hearing on (1) Defendants' Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion for New Trial and for Other Relief 
("Motion to Set Aside Judgment"), (2) Defendants' "Objections" to Proposed Award of Plaintiffs 
Attorney's Fees and Demand for Trial on Attorney's Fees Issue/Claims ("Defendants' Objections"), (3) 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Glen Pettit from Litigation ("Motion to Dismiss"), and (4) Defendants' 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., Motion. The Horton V. Bourne Partnership, Ltd., ("the Bourne Partnership") was 
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represented by Milo Steven Marsden. STC Holdings, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit (together 
"Defendants") were represented by Walter T. Keane. Plaintiff and Defendants submitted memorandums 
of law and presented oral argument, after which the matter was submitted for decision. Being fully 
advised in the premises, and for the reasons stated at the hearing the Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Judgment is DENIED; 
2. Defendants' Objections are WITHDRAWN, pursuant to Defendants' representation at 
the hearing; 
3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED; and 
4. Defendants' Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. Motion is DENIED. 
DATED this iffi^day
 0 f (A>UAA4/^ , 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
<P*HWr~— 
HONORABLfitHOMAS L. KAY 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
ft** 
Walter T. Keane 
Walter T. Keane, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS was 
hand-delivered on t h e / ^ day of March, 2007, to the following: 
Walter T. Keane 
Walter T. Keane, P.C. 
2150 South 1300 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
4826-9710-8737\3 
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